University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2016

On the Sociology of Patenting
Dan L. Burk

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Burk, Dan L., "On the Sociology of Patenting" (2016). Minnesota Law Review. 143.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/143

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

On the Sociology of Patenting
†

Dan L. Burk

INTRODUCTION
In a recent and somewhat controversial essay, Mark
Lemley accuses apologists for the current intellectual property
1
regime of irrationality in the face of contrary evidence. Lemley
points to a range of recent empirical legal studies suggesting
that the intellectual property regime as currently constituted
provides little or no benefit to society, or at least provides no
2
discernible net incentive for innovative or creative behavior.
His indictment focuses on two related responses to such studies. The first is that, in the absence of empirical evidence supporting the provision of patents as an incentive to innovation,

† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. My
thanks to Mark Lemley, Jessica Silbey, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Stephanie
Bair, Shauhin Talesh, Brenda Simon, Ted Sichelman, and participants in the
6th Annual Patent Professor’s Workshop at the University of San Diego for
their comments on previous versions of this work. Any remaining mistakes or
errors are the result of commonly shared narratives that lend structure and
meaning to social behavior. Copyright © 2016 Dan L. Burk.
1. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1328 (2015). Early responses include James Grimmelman, Faith-Based Intellectual Property: A Response, LABORATORIUM (2D SER.) (Apr. 21, 2015), http://
2d.laboratorium.net/post/117023858730/faith-based-intellectual-property-a
-response; Lisa Ouellette, Lemley on Faith-Based IP, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Apr. 2, 2015, 9:59 PM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/04/lemley
-on-faith-based-ip.html; Jeremy Sheff, Faith-Based vs. Value-Based IP: On the
Lemley-Merges Debate, JEREMY SHEFF (Apr. 2, 2015), http://jeremysheff.com/
2015/04/02/faith-based-vs-value-based-ip-on-the-lemley-merges-debate; Lawrence Solum, Lemley on Non-Consequentialist Justifications for Intellectual
Property, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad
.com/legaltheory/2015/04/lemley-on-non-consequentialist-justifications-for
-intellectual-property.html.
2. Id. at 1334–35.
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and in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, substantial numbers of stakeholders continue to cling to the incentive
3
theory of patents and other intellectual property. The second is
that, despite the apparent failure of intellectual property as a
utilitarian enterprise, some commentators have developed alternative, deontological theories to justify continued provision
4
of intellectual property. He brands these as unconscionably
faith-based, because their irrational pre-requisites preclude
5
meaningful dialog with rational, evidence-based policymaking.
Lemley’s indictment of intellectual property as resting on a
sort of secular faith would come as little surprise, and in fact as
something as a given, to many sociologists. Certain schools of
sociological thought have long held that much of social behavior—including the modern reliance on objectivity and rationality—is based in widely accepted myths that enable coherent social functioning. In particular, the so-called “new institutional”
6
school of sociology —which, like other “new” schools of academic inquiry, has in fact been around for a good forty years—takes
explicit account of non-rational scripts or narratives in its
analysis of observed organizational characteristics.
Although this was probably not the intent of Lemley’s essay, here I shall take his observations as a useful starting point
for outlining a new view of what is occurring in the provision of
intellectual property. I suggest that what he calls “faith-based”
behaviors offer a compelling clue to certain puzzles in the observed operation of intellectual property, and are themselves a
compelling phenomenon for study. I will argue that pursuing
such studies militates a turn in intellectual property scholar3. Id. at 1335–36.
4. Id. at 1336–37.
5. Id. at 1346; cf. Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735
(2015) (arguing that metaphors attached to intellectual property rights obscure its utilitarian purposes).
6. Not to be confused with the “new institutional” school of economics,
which Rob Merges and others, including myself, have argued may provide a
useful alternate framework for understanding the economic functioning of intellectual property. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the
New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000); Dan L. Burk &
Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (applying principles drawn from new institutional economics to intellectual property rights).
Political science also has its own separate strain of new institutionalism. See
Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 947 (1996).
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ship toward the tools of new institutional sociology, which is
probably long overdue. Along the way I will sketch a number of
examples from the patent field that seem to me consonant with
a new institutional analysis, and which I suspect would prove
fruitful sites for further investigation. I conclude with some observations regarding what a new institutional analysis of patent law might look like going forward. While my comments are
applicable to intellectual property generally, in this Article I
will concentrate on the patent system as a particularly fertile
area for such analysis.
I. THE PATENT PUZZLE
I should probably make clear at the outset that while I
share Lemley’s core insight—the notion that continued adherence to the virtue of intellectual property is essentially adherence to a kind of myth—I accept very little else in his essay. It
seems to me, for example, quite possible to maintain a productive dialog in which the justifications for a particular legal regime differ and some of them are non-consequentialist. There
are ongoing conversations in criminal law and tort law, for example, where some justifications such as deterrence are utilitarian—and founded on fairly dubious empirical evidence—and
other justifications such as retributivism are entirely deonto7
logical. It may be that the development of deontological intellectual property justifications is a resort to a kind of IP jingoism, adherence to the status quo at any cost, but it may also be
8
part of a fairly normal jurisprudential discussion.
7. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort and Crime,
76 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1996) (arguing that in tort, as in criminal law, deontological justifications can be applied as well as utilitarian justifications).
8. To my mind intellectual property jurisprudence probably includes far
too little in the way of deontological theory. Intellectual property scholarship
seems to be fixated on Locke. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41–72 (1996); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 31–67 (2011); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (applying Lockean natural law theory to
intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
77 GEO. L. REV. 287, 296–329 (1988). But see Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labor and
Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that Locke is inapposite to intellectual property theory). The scholarship also makes occasional forays into the
work of Kant and Hegel. See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra at 73–94 (discussing Hegel);
MERGES, supra at 68–101 (discussing Kant); Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright
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I am rather less interested in the rise of such nonconsequentialist rationales in intellectual property than I am in
the continued persistence of patent incentive theory in the face
of contrary evidence—that is, in adherence to a utilitarian explanation of intellectual property despite apparent failure on
9
its own terms. To the extent that proponents of intellectual
property, particularly proponents of expansive intellectual
property, rest their advocacy on a utilitarian theory of incentive, there is at best very little evidence to support such a position, and at worst a slowly growing body of evidence suggesting
10
the contrary. Thus Lemley’s fundamental point regarding unprovable belief in intellectual property seems to apply with
much greater force to adamant believers in utilitarian patent
incentives.
The underlying disconnection is not a new one. Patenting
has in fact looked fairly irrational for quite a long time. Viable
justifications for patenting continue to remain at odds with
both praxis and theory. The patent system exists, and patenting continues in ever increasing volume. But curiously, the majority of patents appear to go unlicensed, unenforced, and large11
ly forgotten. This is all the more puzzling because patents,
unlike many other forms of intellectual property, do not spring
into existence spontaneously once their subject matter has taken form; patents accrue only after an extended application pro-

and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2012); Hughes, supra at 330–
64 (discussing Hegel); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing Kant and Hegel). The
potential contributions of the majority of the Western philosophical canon—
Nietzsche, Descartes, Hume, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, etc.—remain essentially unexplored, not to mention any
potential insights from non-European philosophical traditions.
9. See generally Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397 (2012) (reviewing principal economic theories justifying intellectual property and their failings).
10. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1332–34 (cataloging contrary evidence).
11. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 11 (2000); Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1503–04
(2001).
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cess before a federal agency. Firms spend significant sums acquiring patents, the majority of which then go unused. Assuming that the firms are behaving rationally, the expenditure of
the costs and fees to obtain a patent must somehow be worthwhile, but there is little evidence that it is rationally justified
by licensing income or similar returns from the patents they
obtain.
Several theories have been proposed to explain why patenting nonetheless occurs. Commentators have noted that patents
may serve other purposes, sometimes acting as assurances of
quality by virtue of their governmental examination and certification; sometimes acting as funding collateral or means of finance; sometimes acting as a strategic deterrent to the threat13
ening patents of competitors. Most notably, some commentators, including Lemley, have argued that patents may serve as
indicators of managerial quality, indicating to the market a
high degree of business acumen in the firm that possesses
14
them. In a frequently cited article, Clarissa Long has articulated an elaborate model for such patent signaling, complete
15
with formal economic models. This function is expected to depend in large measure on the accuracy of patents as signals for
a firm’s competencies, and on the comparative expense to less
16
competent firms of using patents as such indicators.
All these alternative rationales for patenting are for the
most part based on some sort of utility maximization; reflecting
17
the dominance of neo-classical “Chicago school” economics in
the American legal academy, they tend to follow rational actor
models. All of them assume that individuals are behaving in
some predictable, strategic way to further their material interests. Just as importantly where patents are concerned, such rationales also assume that large organizations such as corporations and universities are behaving in predictable, strategic
12. See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus,
26 LAW & LIT. 163, 168 (2014).
13. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137 (2000).
14. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1505–06.
15. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
16. Id. at 648–50.
17. See generally JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL: HOW
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ASSEMBLED THE THINKERS WHO REVOLUTIONIZED ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS (2007) (discussing the Chicago school of economic thought).
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ways to further the organization’s interests. It is well understood that much, if not most, patented innovation and patent
procurement occurs in the context of large research ensembles:
sometimes universities, but more often industrial research
groups, or as Peter Lee reminds us, industrially funded univer18
sity research.
Some inroads have of course been made into strict rational
actor assumptions. Behavioral economics, exploring and documenting a variety of deviances from the rational actor paradigm, begins to acknowledge that individuals do not always behave in strict accordance with the predictions of rational actor
theory: some “irrationalities” are common or pervasive devia19
tions from welfare maximization. Some of the empirical work
20
on patenting follows this behavioral school. Yet even such behavioral experimentation often carries the assumption that
such quirks are aberrations from the norm, which need to be
taken into account in order to fine-tune the rational actor mod21
el. There seems to be little concern that such departures from
rational utility maximization might themselves be the norm, to
which formally predicted rationality is instead the aberration.
And yet there is little or no extant evidence for predicted
outcomes of such economically rational action. For example, the
22
empirical evidence for the signaling model is mixed, and prob18. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships,
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV.
1503, 1550–51 (2012).
19. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (examining endowment effects);
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (same).
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1997) (arguing that rational actor models
are robust enough to incorporate behavioral economic variations); see also
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law-and-Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 25
(1989) (arguing that insights from sociology and psychology could improve rather than supplant the rational actor model).
22. See, e.g., Sebastian Hoenen et al., The Diminishing Signaling Value of
Patents Between Early Rounds of Venture Capital Financing, 43 RES. POL’Y
956, 956 (2014) (finding that small firms benefit from a patent quality signal
only in the first, but not the second, round of start-up financing); Daniel
Hoenig & Joachim Henkel, Quality Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances,
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ably tends not to support that justification—not surprisingly,
there is evidence that investors look to more immediate signals
of firm competence, such as managerial credentials and experi23
ence, to make judgments about the firm. It may of course be
that the existing evidence is faulty. Much of the empirical work
to which Lemley points is by its own admission preliminary;
much of it is published within the law review system and so
lacks the benefit of peer review. At the same time, even if the
evidence suggesting that intellectual property law does not
provide its purported benefits is tenuous, there is little or no
contrary evidence to demonstrate that intellectual property law
does in fact provide a utilitarian benefit.
II. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
If Lemley’s ultimate conclusion regarding the incommensurability of deontological claims seem to me suspect (and perhaps a bit intemperate), his underlying premise, that patents
24
are the opiate of the technocracy, seems on the contrary illuminating, although perhaps not quite in the way it was likely
intended. One might say that the irrationality in the system
runs deep, in more than one sense of the term. On Lemley’s
view, not only are patents and other intellectual property inexplicable in the economically rational sense, but in the absence
of evidence to support these models, continued adherence to
their premises appears irrational in the colloquial sense. In
particular, continued devotion to the incentive theory of intellectual property seems purely a matter of dogma, more an act
25
of faith than an act of reason. The fundamental premise of the
patent system is a myth.
In some sense this observation should not be especially
surprising. We live in a society in which such justifying myths

and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing, 44 RES. POL’Y 1049, 1052,
1058–61 (2015) (finding that patents are valued for their exclusivity, not as a
signal); Dirk Czarnitzki et al., Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications
for Financing Constraints on R&D 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19947, 2014) (finding that small firms, but not large firms, benefit
from a patent quality signal).
23. See Hoenig & Henkel, supra note 22, at 1053–54.
24. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1336.
25. See id. at 1337.
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26

are frequent, ubiquitous, and pervasive : hard work pays off in
the end, all men are created equal, free enterprise leads to
prosperity, honesty is the best policy, and untold similar cultural tropes are generally and reflexively assumed in social action. Countless millions rely, consciously or unconsciously, on
these attitudes in structuring their most routine conduct, although the veracity of the premises is at least suspect. Most
such assumptions are probably wrong at some level, and many
seem demonstrably false. Certainly very few such assumptions
are likely to be empirically verified. Faith-based intellectual
property has plenty of faith-based company.
Such pervasive, dogmatic irrationalities have not gone unnoticed by those who study social behavior, and in particular by
27
those who study organizational behavior. Much of the impetus
of the new institutional literature is an attempt to escape the
stylized rational actor models prevalent not only in neoclassical
economic thinking, but appearing as a disciplinary spillover in
28
other areas of social science. In particular, new institutionalists have resisted ascribing economically rational action to social organizations such as business firms or state agencies,
which have no intrinsic motivations or expectations, but rather
display the emergent conglomerate action of their constituent
29
members. Regarded as complex social entities, such organiza26. See Roger Friedland & Robert P. Alford, Bringing Society Back in:
Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 249 (Walter W. Powell & Paul
J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing the social relationship between symbolic
systems and material practices).
27. As Nobel laureate Douglass North observes, for example:
It is necessary to dismantle the rationality assumption underlying
economic theory in order to approach constructively the nature of
human learning. History demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths,
dogmas, and prejudices matter; and an understanding of the way they
evolve is necessary for further progress in developing a framework to
understand societal change.
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 247, 250 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds.,
1998).
28. Julia Black, New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio-Legal
Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 LAW
& POL’Y 51, 61 (1997); Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics:
Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT. ORG. 325, 329 (1996).
29. See Marietta Baba et al., New Institutional Approaches to Formal Organizations, in A COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY 74, 90 (D.
Douglas Caulkins & Ann T. Jordan eds., 2013).
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tions may be viewed as instead existing according to certain
scripts or myths that mediate the interaction of their constitu30
ent membership with the larger ecology of social actors.
Note that the term “myth” is used here not so much in the
colloquial sense of a fantasy or falsehood (although they may
indeed be such) but rather to designate pervasive social under31
standings or ideologies that bind communities together —
recalling in some ways Mircea Eliade’s definition, in a different
32
context, of myth as a story that is true but not factual. The
myths contemplated by new institutionalism constitute accepted tropes or narratives that articulate socially accepted ration33
ales for achieving desired ends. These rationales are implemented as organizational structures; organizations then
become sites for enacting and re-enacting the ceremonial para34
digms and ideologies prevalent in their social environment.
Such ceremonial behavior is sufficiently ingrained in social
behavior that it becomes nearly invisible, but the adoption of
ceremonial trappings in conformity with social myths is fairly
common, as are the sequelae that flow from such conformities.
Everyday examples offer familiar illustrations of how social
ceremonies work. A white coat and stethoscope are part of the
35
ceremonial garb of the modern Westernized physician. There
is no particular reason that the coat need be white; it might
just as well have been pink or green, but white is the convention that modern Western societies have settled on as the trope
indicating medical expertise. Neither does the white coat and
stethoscope convey any substantive information about the com30. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977).
31. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annette Lavers
trans., 1972) (exploring the structure and significance of modern cultural
myths).
32. See MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 5–8 (Willard R. Trask trans.,
1963).
33. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 344. Some work has attempted
to avoid the popular connotations of the term “myth” by using the term “institutional logic.” See, e.g., Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 248 (describing
the symbolism associated with society’s expression of values).
34. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 346.
35. Cf. Lenny Bernstein, Heart Doctors Are Listening for Clues to the Future of Their Stethoscopes, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/heart-doctors-are-listening-for
-clues-to-the-future-of-their-stethoscopes/2016/01/02/bd73b000-a98d-11e5
-8058-480b572b4aae_story.html (“The stethoscope is also an icon, of course.”).
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petence of the wearer; the wearer may be highly accomplished
or may instead be a quack. Indeed, an accountant or a plumber
with no medical training might well command a good deal of
deference simply by donning a white coat and walking around a
hospital.
Social tropes and ceremonies very commonly change the
structure of the organizations they permeate. Once the white
coat comes into use, it may be incumbent on physicians to acquire one, whether or not the garment is actually germane to
the duties they perform. Further, once white coats have been
adopted, certain ancillary changes to hospitals and clinics will
inevitably follow: vendors will vie to supply white coats, medical providers will need to make provision for their purchase and
distribution, medical facilities will need to install hooks and
hangers for their storage, and to provide laundry services for
their cleaning. It may even make sense to regulate their use in
order to prevent fraud or misperceptions, requiring white coats
under some circumstances or forbidding them at others. The
white coat becomes institutionalized in a particularly social
sense of the word.
A. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONS
The use of the term “institution” as I have just employed it
requires some explanation, as in new institutionalism it constitutes a term of art. As its name implies, new institutionalism is
concerned with the nature and action of institutions, but this
entails meanings different than either those of colloquial usage
or those of usage in other disciplines. As considered by new institutional sociology, institutions are emergent and generalized
systems of factors that constrain individual action and produce
regular patterns of behavior without being repeatedly mobi36
lized to do so. Thus the concept of “institution” is fairly broad
and somewhat ambiguous, including a wide range of social ar37
rangements. One prominent commentator has defined the
concept as comprising the “cognitive, normative, and regulative
36. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
143, 145 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
37. See John W. Meyer et al., Ontology and Rationalization in the Western
Cultural Account, in INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS:
STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND INDIVIDUALISM 9, 10 (W. Richard Scott et al.
eds., 1994).
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structures and activities . . . that provide stability and meaning
38
to social behavior.”
New institutionalism incorporates a strong “cognitive turn”
in sociology, asserting that social institutions provide scripts
and behavioral models that do not merely define proper behav39
ior, but by which individuals construct social realities. Institutions provide the frames that guide human action, defining the
40
universe of conceivable behaviors in a given situation. Institutional tropes both allow individuals to recognize a given situa41
tion and supply the proper scripts with which to react. The
terminology of the theater stage, such as “script,” used to describe institutionalism is quite deliberate; as social actors enter
into particular social roles they both adopt and reinforce the so42
cially appropriate scripts that structure their behavior.
Thus, institutions may be best identified by what they do,
rather than by particular forms or categories. Institutions define what preferences and goals are acceptable and socially
43
sanctioned. They prompt reciprocally typified instances of
habitualized behavior; that is to say, they constitute shared
meanings or understandings linked to particular customary
44
behaviors. Such behaviors are developed to address recurring
problems, and are invoked almost automatically in response to
45
particular situations. These customary patterns of behavior
are viewed by their adherents, when they think about them at
all, as essential, indispensable, and commonplace; consequently
46
they serve as important sources of social stability.

38. W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 33 (1995).
39. Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 948.
40. See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 4 (1986); Hall & Taylor, supra note 6.
41. See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 948.
42. See John W. Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theories of Organizations, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 790,
794 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008).
43. See Black, supra note 28, at 68.
44. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 54 (1967).
45. See Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker, The Institutionalization of
Institutional Theory, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 175, 180
(Stewart R. Clegg et al. eds., 1996).
46. Cf. Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726 (1977) (analyzing the relationship between institutionalization and generational uniformity, maintenance, and resistance).
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Perhaps most importantly, the term “institution” in this
parlance is not synonymous with the term “organization,” but
rather designates ambient norms and conventions that have
47
become social fixtures, lending them legitimacy. Such cultural
constructs or scripts may be reflected in structural organiza48
tions. A key tenet of new institutionalism is that localized individual and organizational actions are influenced by institu49
tions that operate in a wider environment. Thus the level of
analysis for new institutionalism is that of the organizational
50
field, which might also be termed the arena of action. The
field comprises a community of disparate organizations that
51
engage in common activities subject to similar influences.
Fields are often contested, incorporating competing interests,
and gain stability by organizing around well-defined patterns of
behavior that exert homogenizing pressures on the constituent
52
organizations. Thus the social rules and practices that are
pervasive throughout an organization’s field set the framework
53
for the organization’s structure and outlook.
B. ORGANIZATIONS
Much of the impetus for new institutionalism has been investigation of the similarities, or isomorphisms, of organiza54
tions in diverse settings. New institutionalists consider the origins of organizational templates, their promulgation, and their
55
transformations. Rational actor models assert that organizations develop particular characteristics in response to market

47. See Black, supra note 28, at 57.
48. See Edwin Amenta & Kelly M. Ramsey, Institutional Theory, in
HANDBOOK OF POLITICS: STATE AND SOCIETY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 15, 19
(Kevin T. Leicht & J. Craig Jenkins eds., 2010).
49. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 790.
50. See id. at 792.
51. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,
48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983).
52. See Andrew J. Hoffman, Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 351, 357
(1999).
53. See Black, supra note 28, at 57–58.
54. See Thomas B. Lawrence & Masoud Shadnam, Institutional Theory, in
5 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION 2289, 2290 (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008).
55. See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 44.
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forces that require competitive efficiency, implying that similar
structures are a response to the dictates of efficiency. But new
institutionalists largely reject the notion that organizational
decisions and resultant behaviors constitute a rational re56
sponse to achieve efficiency in the face of external stimuli.
Rather, new institutionalism holds that organizations
make decisions, not necessarily to solve existing problems or to
further functional needs, but out of the convergence of opportunity, strategic interests, and internal and external influences.
Some new institutionalists have addressed this irregular mélange of discordant factors that has been dubbed the “garbage
57
can” model of organizational decision-making. These analyses
observe uncertainty rather than rationality leading to decisions, and just as often observe it leading to non-decisions or
58
failures to act. New institutionalist approaches suggest that
organizations deal with uncertainty by adopting accepted rou59
tines that are regarded as stable and legitimate. Such readily
available models, pervasive throughout a given field, may be
supplied by a variety of exogenous sources, particularly by law,
by culture, or by professional expertise.
Thus new institutionalism has been particularly concerned
with the way that organizational structures are shaped by reg60
ulation, normative custom, and pervasive social scripts. This
set of influences has been designated by some as coercive, mi61
metic, and normative. In the first category are formal or informal pressures from outside the organization: the state or
other cultural institutions may impose requirements on organi62
zations that make them resemble one another. Second, organizations may come to resemble one another because leaders or
managers consciously imitate models seen in other organizations—in particular, professionals within organizations, such
56. See NILS BRUNSSON, THE IRRATIONAL ORGANIZATION: IRRATIONALITY
BASIS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION AND CHANGE 3–4 (1985); Black, supra note 28, at 59.
57. E.g., Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972).
58. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 789.
59. See Black, supra note 28, at 60.
60. See Walter W. Powell & Jeannette Anastasia Colyvas, New Institutionalism, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 975,
976 (Stewart R. Clegg & James R. Bailey eds., 2008).
61. See, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 51, at 150.
62. See id.
AS A
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as attorneys, accountants, or managers may draw on educational or professional knowledge to provide mimetic struc63
tures. Organizations may also resemble one another due to
norms or social obligations that have been internalized by their
64
constituents.
Of particular interest here is the organizational adoption of
policies, structures, and programs in order to align themselves
with dominant social myths. In many cases this is not a calculated decision; it is simply accepted as the way things are
65
properly done. In a more deliberative mode, organizations
may be seeking social conformity through ceremonial or symbolic practices that communicate legitimacy to their various
66
constituencies. Ambient social rituals and symbols may be
67
mobilized strategically to legitimate particular ends. Many
organizational structures implement ceremonial functions intended to demonstrate the organization’s acceptance and adoption of external values.
One implication of this approach is that formal structures
may be not only functional, but also symbolic, signaling an organization’s investment in shared social narratives and expec68
tations. Indeed, the adoption of structures or practices may
not be dictated by the organization’s goals or by its functions,
but rather by the need for legitimacy and social order. The
structures and policies adopted may not necessarily be more efficient in the functional sense of furthering the organization’s
operations, but they are determined responses to the social en69
vironment. Satisfying institutionalized myths may take prec70
edence over functionality.
For example, as Meyer and Rowan observed nearly forty
71
years ago in their germinal article on institutional myths, re63. See id. at 151.
64. See id. at 152.
65. See Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 254.
66. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 742 (1984).
67. See Black, supra note 28, at 69; Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at
254.
68. See Lauren Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1567–68
(1992); Lawrence & Shadnam, supra note 54, at 2289–90.
69. See Lawrence & Shadnam, supra note 54.
70. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 340–41.
71. Id.
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search and development programs may in fact produce research
and development, but that is perhaps the least of their institutional functions. Such programs also signal the propriety, authenticity, sobriety, and competiveness of the firm. Serious, respectable, innovative firms have research and development
programs; firms without a research and development program
are unattractive prospects for investment or employment. The
rationale or social trope for research and development programs may be that they will produce new and innovative products or methods, yielding a competitive advantage, and a firm
that is not at least trying to generate such advantages may be
less competitive. But regardless of what a given research and
development program actually produces, the lack of a program
may be viewed with suspicion by shareholders, investors, customers, and other constituencies within the firm’s field.
Similarly, some studies show corporations adopt formal
procedures for employee due process both to mollify potentially
disgruntled employees and to show good-faith compliance with
72
regulatory requirements. Employers who comply with such
expectations are more likely to secure government contracts or
grants, attract qualified workers, and deflect regulatory scruti73
ny. Indeed, the survival and success of organizations may be
dependent on the adoption of structures that signal social participation and conformity, rather than dependent on the organ74
ization’s actual functions or performance. By incorporating
the rationalized narratives of its surrounding community, the
organization reflects collective values, garners social approval,
and deflects criticism or adverse scrutiny. This serves to promote the stability, survival, and success of an organization by
aligning both internal and external constituencies with pervasive social scripts.
At the same time, this influential dynamic flows in both directions, meaning that the institutional tropes within an organizational field also influence law or regulation relevant to that
field. Managerial practices and assumptions influence the way

72. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation:
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 406 (1999); John
Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, 99 AM. J. SOC. 944, 946
(1994).
73. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 1542.
74. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 352; Tolbert & Zucker, supra
note 45, at 178.
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in which organizations understand law and compliance with
75
the law. These logics spread from organization to organization
within the organizational field by mimesis, by professional
networking, and by other educational exchanges. Eventually
they become routinized background assumptions that are taken
for granted. Courts frequently adopt or defer to custom in an
76
industry. Legislatures similarly incorporate the routine practices of organizational fields into the regulations governing that
77
field. Thus recent research has shown in a number of circumstances how these routinized understandings of law shape the
78
content and meaning of judicial decisions and legislation.
C. LOOSE COUPLING
As I have described, new institutionalism posits the ceremonial adoption of organizational functions, either as a matter
of course, or to conform to expectations in the field. At the same
time, it is well understood that there is likely to be a gap between social expectation and actual practice, between the myth
79
and reality. The signal sent by ceremonial adoption of a program or organizational structure may be pure façade, having
little to do with the organization’s actual working functions.
Pervasive myths or tropes may be necessary to legitimacy and
cohesion, but because they are not necessarily grounded in the
actual function of an organization, they may be detrimental to
smooth or efficient operation of the organization. Ceremonial
compliance may divert resources from core functions, or in

75. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the
Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001) (analyzing managerial
practices relating to diversity); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83 (2005) (arguing that managerial practices relating to
sexual harassment limit protection for women).
76. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 889
(2011).
77. See Shauhin A. Talesh, Institutional and Political Sources of Legislative Change: Explaining How Private Organizations Influence the Form and
Content of Consumer Protection Legislation, 39 L. & SOC. INQ. 973, 973 (2014).
78. See Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of Law, in PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 55, 81–90 (Justin
O’Brien ed., 2007).
79. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 356.
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some cases may demand actions that are diametrically opposed
80
to those that would further an organization’s actual work.
Consequently, new institutionalism predicts that at times
there may be a dissociation between actual practice and social
convention, allowing both to simultaneously exist without conflict. Organizations may accomplish this by instituting only a
“loose coupling” between the social narratives by which they ostensibly operate and the actual procedures and systems under
81
which they in fact operate. Such loose coupling between the
real and the ideal allows both myth and reality to co-exist in
the same organization, by paying lip service to the proper social
script while essential organizational activity proceeds separate82
ly. Compliance with the prevailing myth may exist in parallel
with de facto disregard of the social trope, and even alongside
83
outright noncompliance.
Indeed, where an organization has bifurcated social scripts
from its actual operations, full implementation of the social
scripts may precipitate a crisis within the organization, crippling its regular functions. For example, detailed ethnographic
study of one public school highlighted the loose coupling between actual administrative practice in the school and the pervasive public rhetoric of teacher accountability and student as84
sessment. Although the school was by necessity required to
adopt and repeat the public tropes related to education, these
were in practice largely ignored and given largely superficial lip
service, while teachers instead focused on actual student needs
85
and learning. Subsequent attempts to more tightly align
school practice with the tropes of accountability and assessment disrupted the normal teaching and learning mechanisms
of the school, creating chaos and dysfunction and leading to a
80. Cf. Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1–3 (1976) (noting that in some “loosely coupled”
systems, there may be little relationship between an organization’s goals and
its methods).
81. See Meyer, supra note 42, at 802–03.
82. See Kimberly D. Elsbach & Robert I. Sutton, Acquiring Organizational Legitimacy Through Illegitimate Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and
Impression Management Theories, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 699, 699 (1992).
83. See Weick, supra note 80, at 7.
84. See Tim Hallett, The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil,
and Inhabited Institutions in an Urban Elementary School, 75 AM. SOC. REV.
52 (2010).
85. Id. at 59–62.
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breakdown of not only the routine functions of the school, but of
the outcomes that were ostensibly expected to proceed from ac86
countability and assessment.
III. RATIONALITY REDUX
The new institutional emphasis is on socially compliant
behavior, and while this is taken as a separate question from
that of economic rationality, the sociological analysis is not
necessarily entirely divorced from the concept of rationality—at
least, not from rationality of a certain type. Some commentators have begun exploring this territory between new institutionalism and rational action, relying on concepts of bounded
rationality that assume actors behave rationally under con87
straints of limited information and immediacy. Social scripts
and myths might be said to set the bounds within which an actor behaves. And, as I have mentioned previously, at the organizational level, adopting the social scripts prevalent in the field
might be viewed as rational, even strategic, in the sense that
an organization which signals social compliance is more likely
to attract resources and attain a stable position that allows it to
88
survive.
But the rationality of social institutionalism is not the rationality of neo-classical economics. New institutional rationality is not merely bounded, but so bounded as to lie nearly out of
the bounds contemplated by economic analysis. Rational economic action has been defined as choosing the best means to
89
achieve the chooser’s ends. But new institutionalism recognizes that the chooser’s preferences and the acceptable means do
not exist independently; they are the result of the same social
environment that defines both what is desirable and which
90
means are “best.” Institutional influences define both what is
desirable and how desires are satisfied. For example, within an
organization, the individual’s position and responsibilities will
91
tend to define his or her preferences. An individual’s prefer86. Id. at 62–66.
87. E.g., Victor Nee, Sources of the New Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 1, 10–12 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds.,
1998).
88. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
89. See Posner, supra note 21, at 1551.
90. See Friedland & Alford, supra note 26, at 233–34.
91. See id.
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ences, which undergird her rational choices, are not only
bounded but defined by social influences and relationships to
92
other actors.
Stated differently, new institutionalism views both ration93
ality and efficiency as socially constructed concepts. Thus the
cognitive basis for new institutionalism posits individuals acting rationally, not necessarily in the sense of advancing their
material well-being, but in the sense of defining and expressing
94
their identities in socially appropriate ways. Organizational
responses and structures that become institutionalized within
an organizational field come be to be seen as rational. The new
institutional inquiry is not whether a given activity optimizes
either personal or social welfare; the question is instead whether there is an acceptable legitimizing explanation for the activity. The explanation offered for a given behavior may well be the
purported optimization of personal or social welfare, but it is
the acceptability of the story, rather than its objective effect,
that is important. Thus the actors of the new institutionalism
are less rational utility maximizers than they are maximal utility rationalizers.
This is not to say that efficiency and market forces play no
role in the structure or behavior of organizations, only to say
that these are at best one component in a complex matrix of influences on such institutions. Meyer and Rowan suggest that
the relative influence of market efficiency and social narratives
may be determined by the type of production and the outputs in
95
different sectors; Tolbert and Zucker suggest that both market
influences and social influences are likely to be present in dif96
ferent measures in different situations at different times.
Moreover, adherence to the prevailing script may be to some
extent a self-fulfilling prophecy: investors are more likely to invest in a firm that is behaving properly innovatively, thus
providing it with the resources that could in fact foster innovation. Innovative employees may gravitate to firms that follow
the innovation script, imbuing the firm with the talent needed
for engaging in actual innovation. Customers seeking innova-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Black, supra note 28, at 64.
See Finnemore, supra note 28.
See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6, at 949.
Meyer & Rowan, supra note 30, at 354.
Tolbert & Zucker, supra note 45.
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tive solutions may buy from firms perceived as innovative,
spurring the firm to supply innovative products.
But as the literature on loose coupling suggests, social imperatives and efficiency may conflict with one another, dictating opposing organizational structures and incompatible resource allocation. An organization that is wholly indifferent to
the efficiency of its functions is likely not long for this world,
but it seems nonetheless clear that a highly efficient organization that lacks the trust and approval of its associated constituencies is also not long for this world. At the same time, highly
inefficient organizations that have gained social respect and
validation may endure a very long time indeed. Indeed, the
framework of institutional legitimacy offers a plausible theory
as to the survival of any number of inefficient political, social,
and business organizations that would otherwise be expected to
97
have failed and disappeared long ago.
IV. NEW INSTITUTIONAL PATENTING
As Professor Lemley observes, patents seem not to fit well
98
into economic incentive models. But they may prove a better
fit to the parameters of new institutionalism that I have described above. New institutional approaches offer two characteristic features that may be of particular use in considering
the social role of patents. First, new institutional analysis focuses on the distinctive qualities of organizations, and that
seems clearly the correct level of scrutiny for patenting behavior. Patent scholarship has tended to focus on behavior at the
99
individual, rather than the corporate level, but patents are
overwhelmingly obtained, held, and enforced by organizations,

97. See MARSHALL W. MEYER
ING ORGANIZATIONS 45 (1989).

& LYNNE G. ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAIL-

98. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337.
99. For example, commentators such as Stephanie Bair and Greg Mandel
have canvassed the psychological literature to assess its consonance with incentive theory and other justifications for patenting, but primarily at the level
of individual rather than organizational behaviors. See Stephanie Plamondon
Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015) (discussing patent incentives’ psychological effects on individuals); Gregory N.
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011) (discussing the
patent system’s effect on individual creativity).
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100

typically corporations or universities. New institutionalism
moves the conversation further in the direction begun by
Stephanie Bair, who has argued that the corporate-social milieu must be taken into account in assessing the efficacy of the
101
incentive rationale for intellectual property, or by Julie Cohen, who has shown how intellectual property is a form of
property best viewed as an incentive to the corporate entity, not
102
the individual.
Of course the prevalent discourse on intellectual property
is not couched in terms of corporate property, but is perfused
instead by the myth of the solitary genius who is motivated and
103
rewarded for his efforts. And that brings us to the second useful feature of new institutionalism, which is its orientation toward assessing the effects of those myths that are prevalent in
the field. Jessica Silbey has already gestured in this direction
in pioneering work on the power of narrative in justifying intel104
lectual property allocations. A new institutional approach
pushes such observations a step further, suggesting the primacy of narrative for organizational behaviors and structures involving intellectual property in general, and patents in particu105
lar.
Taking such myths seriously suggests that patent law
106
shapes preferences and structures social action, but not necessarily in the manner contemplated under the myth of incen-

100. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000);
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2008).
101. Stephanie Bair, Employee Creativity, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m9ZFvBncAzw&app.
102. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy:
A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (characterizing intellectual
property as an incentive for capital rather than an incentive for creativity).
103. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV.
709, 709 (2012).
104. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008); see also Frye, supra note 5 (critiquing intellectual property tropes).
105. Kevin Collins has explored some aspects of semiosis within patent
doctrine. Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter
Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010). Here the patent itself becomes a
social signifier. Cf. BARTHES, supra note 31, at 111–26 (explaining the semiotics of cultural myth).
106. See Black, supra note 28, at 75.
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tive to innovate. Rather, patent law carries a narrative as to
what is socially acceptable or desirable; patent acquisition is
then either routinely accepted as what organizations ought to
do, or may even be instrumentally deployed to signal conformi107
ty with that narrative. In either case, acquisition of patents
appears strongly ceremonial, demonstrating organizational adherence to prevalent narratives of innovation, competition, and
success. Patents may demonstrate to venture capitalists,
shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies that the firm
is behaving as it ought. Patent acquisition may satisfy these
constituencies that the firm is technologically progressive and
innovative, worthy of the trust that investment or employment
entails.
On this theory, acquisition of patents sends a type of signal
to competitors, employees, and investors, and so may seem
reminiscent of the Long signaling model of patents as an indi108
cator of a firm’s qualities. But new institutionalism cautions
that adherence to cultural myths is not necessarily a signal regarding a firm’s actual or functional qualities, and certainly not
109
a signal of economic efficiency. Rather, the signal in question
here is a social or ceremonial signal, not an economic one. The
signal is one of compliance and reputability, an indication of
participation in the expected social order. Patents serve as a token of such compliance because they are integral to the pervasive narrative of innovation, of competence, of competitiveness.
The firm may or may not in fact be innovative, competent, or
competitive, but that is largely beside the point: holding patents demonstrates its adoption of the proper role in the proper
social script.
This may go a considerable way toward explaining certain
puzzles involving patents, such as the puzzle of start-up financing. As I have mentioned above, it seems clear as a factual matter that before investing in a start-up technology firm, venture
110
capitalists like the firm to hold patents. Exactly why venture

107. Cf. William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 374–88
(2011) (collecting examples of positive social attitudes towards patents and innovation).
108. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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capitalists prefer to see patents is more of a mystery. Economists looking at the question have searched for some efficiency
rationale, such as signals of management competency; the re112
sults of such investigations are equivocal. The most straightforward explanation may simply be the new institutional suggestion that venture capitalists look for patents as a marker of
innovation because patents are what innovative firms are supposed to have. This is of course somewhat tautological; but to
the extent that patents embody a social trope of innovation that
is pervasive throughout the field, the tautology would come as
no surprise to new institutionalists.
A rather different type of patent signaling has been suggested by some commentators drawing from the larger scholar113
ly literature on expressive law. This literature suggests that
one function of legal imperatives, particularly in areas such as
constitutional and criminal law, is to communicate certain values, whether or not the law is successful in directly altering
behavior. Some patent scholars have suggested that certain patent doctrines may accomplish similar goals; for example, otherwise ineffective limitations on patentable subject matter
might serve to legitimate patent law by communicating to a
skeptical public certain limitations and aspirations on the am114
bit of the patent system. This is a rather different type of expression than that contemplated by new institutionalism, although the state is certainly an organization permeated by
social institutions. Examination of the patent field might well
reveal parallels in adoption of patent tropes by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office or other agencies such as
the United States Trade Representative.
Related to its consideration of social scripts, and its emphasis on organizational replication, is new institutionalism’s
rejection of the rational actor models that have dominated eco111. See Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation: Discerning Diversity Among Patent Functions, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 441, 459 (2013) (discussing ethnographic
data from patent practitioners indicating that patents are an “empty placeholder” for some value criterion investors are seeking).
112. See id.
113. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973 (2015) (arguing that patent eligibility rules perform
expressive functions); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012) (discussing expressive functions
for intellectual property law).
114. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 113.
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115

nomics and related social sciences. This strikes me as an additionally appealing feature of the new institutional approach,
recognizing that even if individuals behave as economically rational actors—a dubious proposition—there is no reason to believe that the emergent behavior of organizations, constituting
groups of such individuals, will necessarily be in any sense economically rational. This in turn suggests that there is no reason to believe that the observed behavior of corporations, universities, or other organizations in procuring, holding, or
enforcing patents will be either coherent or rational. Since
there is little evidence that patenting behavior is rational in
the sense predicted by rational actor models, it may be time for
models that are not dependent on such assumptions. Ceremonial patenting is an excellent candidate for such an explanation
that is coherent with other observed activity of large organizations.
At the same time, note that none of this necessarily precludes patents from acting, at least sometimes, as an incentive
to innovation, nor for that matter of acting sometimes as a sig116
nal as to managerial quality and the like. A white coat and a
stethoscope are integral to the cultural persona of the physician, but no doubt the coat does protect the wearer’s street
clothes from stains, and nothing stops the physician from using
an otherwise ceremonial stethoscope for diagnostic purposes
when appropriate. No doubt once one has a stack of ceremonial
patents, they can be sometimes put to use as collateral, or deployed as a litigation deterrent, or engaged in the myriad other
ways that commentators have suggested patents may be
117
used.
A. LOOSE COUPLING
Patent convention and actual practice may also entail exactly the type of loose coupling predicted and explained under
118
new institutionalism. Such effects are perhaps most striking
in the case of university technology transfer offices. Since the
Reagan-era passage of the Stevenson Technology Transfer Act
and the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have been permitted and

115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.

2016]

ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF PATENTING

445

encouraged to retain ownership of patents arising from federal
119
Major research institutions have estabresearch funding.
lished technology transfer offices to manage the acquisition and
120
licensing of such patents. This seems a sensible reaction to
the accumulation of patents in universities, but presents a fiscal puzzle. Empirical evidence suggests that university technology transfer seldom results in appreciable income for the
university, and technology transfer offices in many cases will
121
consume more resources than they generate. Logically, in
terms of money spent and money earned, one might expect universities to forgo patent acquisition. And yet such programs are
122
common.
This may be due to loose coupling between the functional
and mythical structures of universities. Patents and associated
technology transfer structures may be playing a separate, ceremonial, non-pecuniary role for research universities. Public
universities are under perennial pressure to justify their consumption of taxpayer subsidies. Private universities are not
free from such pressures, having to justify their activities to
alumni and to philanthropic donors, a fundraising imperative
that public universities increasingly share. The existence of a
technology transfer office allows universities to demonstrate
that the university is “giving back” to the community, stimulating local business and economic growth by moving the fruits of
research into the commercial sector. Tech transfer programs al-

119. See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2004); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby,
University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003).
120. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing, 23
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 620, 620 (2007).
121. See WALTER D. VALDIVIA, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS,
UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1
(2013) (noting that the typical tech transfer model is unprofitable for most
universities); Irene Abrams et al., How Are U.S. Technology Transfer Offices
Tasked and Motivated—Is It All About the Money?, 17 RES. MGMT. REV. 18, 18
(2009); Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay off? Evidence from a Survey
of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16
YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 286 (2014); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 120, at
622.
122. See Lorelai Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities
Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007).
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so allow the university to demonstrate that they are in some
sense earning their keep, pursuing licensing business opportunities as a funding source, and not simply sponging off the largess of the taxpayers or of private donors. Thus university patenting and patent licensing may serve a largely ceremonial
function, even if such programs seem irrational from the perspective of actual revenue generation.
The concept of loose coupling seems apparent in numerous
other patent settings. The great patent scandal of the early
twenty-first century has been the rise of firms known variously
as “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), “patent assertion entities”
123
(PAEs), or pejoratively as “patent trolls.” These firms acquire
a large portfolio of unused dormant patents, and then actively
license and enforce them for revenue, as their primary business
124
activity. This practice has created not only an extensive critical scholarly literature, but an enormous outcry among other
affected businesses in the information and communication sec125
tor. This has prompted reaction from both the judiciary and
from Congress. Patent trolling appears to be directly responsible for a number of judicial changes in patent doctrine and procedure, and is also substantially responsible for the extensive
legislative overhaul of the patent statute that took effect in
126
2013.
The most striking feature of this patent phenomenon is
that these PAEs have deployed patents in precisely the way
that patents were supposedly intended to be used, and in the
way that, as previously mentioned, has been puzzlingly absent
from the vast majority of patents issued: patents held by
“trolls” are actually licensed and enforced. Indeed, the acquisition and assertion of patent portfolios by trolls takes seriously
the pervasive trope in patent parlance that these are property
rights, like any other property rights, and comparable to the

123. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459
(2012).
124. See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, RentSeeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009).
125. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009);
Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013).
126. Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned,
REGULATION, Winter 2012–2013, at 20.
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127

paradigm of property rights in land. The business model
adopted by PAEs looks in many respects very much like the acquisition and management of tangible property such as real estate portfolios. But actually treating patents as property has
created an uproar. The patent system appeared to work fairly
well when patents were largely ceremonial, that is when the
myth of exclusive rights was only loosely coupled to the actual
deployment of patents. But when practice began to align with
the pervasive social narrative of property, the system was
thrown into crisis.
Similar evidence of loose coupling may also be extant in the
biotechnology field. Patent scholars have long noted the potential for a breakdown of research in the biotechnology area due
128
to a crowded field of overlapping patents. Biotechnology researchers face a thicket of patents that may constrain their
freedom to operate, resulting in a potential “anti-commons” in
which research and development could grind to a standstill due
to the necessity of clearing multiple licenses. Puzzlingly, despite the presence of densely overlapping patents, biotechnology research has gone forward—much of the anticipated thicket
has now been cleared by recent Supreme Court jurispru129
dence —but there was little evidence of deterred research be-

127. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990) (drawing parallels between intellectual
property and tangible property); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the
Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2010) (advocating the comparison of intellectual and real property); Richard A. Epstein, Professor, Univ. of Chi., Remarks at the Aspen Summit: The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual
Property (Aug. 21, 2006) (transcript available in Release 13.24 from The Progress & Freedom Foundation) (discussing the strong similarities between intellectual property and other types of property). But see Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1,
32–56 (2015) (distinguishing characteristics of intellectual property from other
categories of property); Mark A. Lemley Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–48 (2006) (discussing the
fallacious comparison of intellectual property to real property).
128. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–
99 (1998).
129. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (holding that naturally occurring genomic DNA patents comprise
ineligible subject matter).
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130

fore the court’s intervention. Several studies investigating
this lack of a biotechnology anti-commons effect have shown
that the predicted crisis failed to emerge, not due to any clearance or withdrawal of the threatening patents, but rather be131
cause researchers simply ignore them.
Such studies show the narrative of biotechnology patenting
is not merely loosely coupled, but almost entirely uncoupled
from actual practice. Conventional narratives regarding innovation, and biotechnology in particular, tell us that strong patent rights are essential to the development of a robust tech132
In
nical sector, characterized by small start-up firms.
practice, however, we find that the majority of such patents are
neither licensed nor enforced, allowing necessary, but potentially infringing, research to proceed. And, as in the case of the
public school study previously described, or as I have suggested
is the case for patent trolling, one similarly suspects that the
re-coupling of narrative and practice in biotechnology, to enforce and license the patents, would result in enormous disruption to the furtherance of biomedical research.
B. INSTITUTIONALIZED PATENT LAW
As described above, one of the most active areas of current
new institutional inquiry examines how institutionalized practices within organizational fields shape the content and mean133
ing of formal law. One would expect that patent law, too, has
been profoundly shaped by the institutionalized practices of the
patent field. Patent law is a relatively insular area of practice,
encompassing a highly specialized appellate court that hears
patent cases, a specialized federal agency that reviews and
grants patent applications, and a specialized cadre of legal
practitioners with their own distinctive credentials and associa134
tions. Lobbying, favoritism, and “capture” of governmental
130. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement,
Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS.
L. REV. 1059 (2008) (summarizing and interpreting empirical studies).
131. See John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 303 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
132. See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1513–19 (2005).
133. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
134. See Burk & Reyman, supra note 12, at 174–76 (describing the institutional constituencies surrounding patents).
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patent actors such as the United States Patent Office, the Congressional committees covering patents, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, are a constant concern. But the
question here is less the conscious legalization of preferential
treatment—although that certainly may play a role in organizational practice—than the incorporation of routine, habitual,
unremarkable background assumptions of the field into formal
law.
It is likely, then, that expectations within the field—
expectations of patent attorneys, patent owners, patent licensors and licenses—have over time become formally incorporated into the legal regime. There are undoubtedly myriad examples of such “bottom up” or “endogenous” institutional
additions to patent law, but I will offer here only one illustrative historical example. Modern patent documents end with a
series of numbered sentences called “claims” that are intended
to delineate the technological boundaries of the inventor’s pa135
tent rights. But patents did not always include claims. Early
nineteenth-century patents consisted only of what we would
136
now term the disclosure portion of the document. Then, in response to court decisions invalidating patents that seemed to
encompass old technology, patent drafters began to break out
as a separate sentence an explicit statement identifying the
137
novel portion of the invention. This was not a substitute for
the description, nor was it formally required; it was merely a
textual device intended to highlight and distinctly state what
was novel.
Including such separate statements in patent applications
became common practice among patent professionals, then became an expected feature of the patent, and then in the midnineteenth century became formally required by statute as part
138
of the patent document. Today patent claims are not merely
139
expected, they are required as a matter of statute. And in the
interim, they have become central to patent practice. An exten-

135. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 10–13 (2009) (explaining the structure of patents).
136. See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent
Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757–58 (1948).
137. See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 134, 139–41 (1938).
138. See RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 2–4 (1949).
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
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sive body of doctrine and practice has grown up around the
drafting of claims, the structure of claims, and the interpreta140
tion of claims. The administrative process of patent procurement largely revolves around the formal proposal and approval
141
of claim text; similarly, the judicial process of patent enforcement largely revolves around the construction and appli142
cation of claim text. The pervasive incorporation of claiming
into patent law thus indicates how institutionalization of a legal drafting practice can come to shape the field.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with a few words regarding the significance and
possible direction of the suggestions I have made here. The new
institutional approaches that I have suggested allow for a conversation about the mythology of patent law even though they
reject, or at least circumnavigate, the economic incentive paradigm for patents. This is not an unfamiliar path for legal scholarship, although it may be novel for the patent field. New institutionalism has for the last two decades been a fixture of the
“law and society” school of hybrid legal and sociological analy143
sis, having been deployed both theoretically and empirically
144
to examine a wide range of legal institutions. But there has to
date been no extension of its tenets to consideration of the patent system; for that matter, sociological analysis of any kind
145
directed toward the patent system has been a rarity.

140. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1748–50 (2009)
(describing the function and use of claims).
141. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 135, at 13–15 (summarizing the process of patent prosecution).
142. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 140, at 1749–52 (discussing judicial
claim construction).
143. See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths:
The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 903 (1996) (mapping out applications of new institutionalism to law).
144. See Black, supra note 28; Talesh, supra note 77, at 979 (reviewing the
application of new institutionalism to law).
145. Notable exceptions are found in William Hubbard’s exploration of patenting and social norms and in Laura Pedraza-Fariña’s application of the
community of practice framework to patentable innovation. Hubbard, supra
note 107; Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 813.
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I have suggested here several likely areas for application of
new institutional analysis, and I have primarily engaged the
literature on social scripts or tropes, focusing primarily on the
cognitive strand of research. I have not discussed here the rest
146
of the “three pillars” of new institutionalism, such as coercive
or normative influences, but they likely offer similarly attractive sites of patent research, and I would anticipate lines of
productive scholarship investigating instances where these in147
fluences intersect. In some instances the influence of one or
another of these sources may be more pointed or pervasive.
Certainly the coercive or regulatory pressures generated by the
patent system should play an important role in organizational
structures, perhaps where organizations anticipate litigation.
For example, I have noted above that virtually all U.S. research universities have technology transfer offices and suggested they have ceremonial explanation for their continued ex148
But that explanation surely does not operate in
istence.
isolation. To some extent the proliferation of such offices may
be simply mimetic, due to imitation of other research universities that have instituted technology transfer offices. And to a
substantial degree, implementation of such offices is regulatory
or coercive, due to the opportunities and requirements for ownership of patented technologies arising from federally funded
research, imposed under the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson
149
Technology Transfer Act.
Overall what I have proposed of course is an extended hypothesis that requires empirical verification. This may also
chart a path unfamiliar to patent scholarship; verification or
refutation of my suggestions lies in the kind of “thick” descriptive ethnography that has been largely lacking in patent stud150
ies. While empirical studies of the patent system are all the
rage, most of what has been done to date tends to simply quantify activity, without tying the numbers generated to any

146. See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 33–52 (deploying the terminology of
“three pillars” for new institutional scholarship).
147. For an initial foray into the normative structure of patenting, see
Hubbard, supra note 107.
148. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
149. See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 119.
150. Here Jessica Silbey’s ethnographic study of creativity and innovation
offers a welcome exception. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS,
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015).
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151

broader social theory or framework. As Jessica Silbey has
pointed out, such studies may give us little sense of what is actually occurring in the intellectual property system, because
152
they are not formulated to do so. They neither look for evidence of established social frameworks, nor attempt to formulate new frameworks within which the social action of intellec153
tual property law might be generally understood.
Application of new institutional analysis along the lines I
have suggested offers not a justification for intellectual property regimes, but an explanation as to how they are functioning.
Justifications, particularly the evidentiary justifications that
most interest Professor Lemley, might need to wait for explanation. The most sensible way forward may be to simply accept
that patents have settled into particular social roles as part of
the ecology of business and technical innovation. We can then
begin to determine just what role patents are playing. This may
in turn lead to some discussion of whether those roles are a
good thing or a bad thing, but the first order of business is to
follow patents in action and build some understanding of their
social function.
This stance is entirely pragmatic, and largely agnostic with
regard to the social value of patents. The patents are there,
they are doing something, and given the time and effort invested in them, whatever they are doing is obviously of enormous
significance to the communities that surround them. Patents
may or may not be justified on grounds of efficiency, fairness,
virtue, or any other conceivable criterion. But taking the patent
system as a given, which in the foreseeable future is unlikely to
either disappear or to undergo radical change, allows us to focus on how, rather than why the system is operating, and opens
the field for sustained inquiry on the sociology of patenting.

151. There are also a few welcome exceptions to this trend, such as Laura
Pedraza-Fariña’s work, supra note 145, or Laura Foster, Patents, Biopolitics,
and Feminisms: Locating Patent Law Struggles over Breast Cancer Genes and
the Hoodia Plant, 19 INT’L J. CULTURAL. PROP. 371 (2012).
152. See Silbey, supra note 111, at 448–52.
153. See id.

